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| Robert E. Lee (Source: Wikimedia Commons) |
The Gettysburg campaign was the last significant invasion of the North. About a week after the battle ended, CS Brig. Gen. John Hunt Morgan led a cavalry raid into Indiana and Ohio to disrupt the flow of supplies to the Army of the Cumberland; beyond some bridge and railroad damage, and tying up some cavalry in chasing him, his most significant accomplishment was to get captured.
Surrender may be the logical end of defensive warfare, but it isn’t the inevitable or necessary end, as had been shown by the Romans in the Second Punic War, the Americans during the Revolution and the Communists in Vietnam. As long as Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia stayed in
Virginia, they had the blessing of interior lines and intimate knowledge of the terrain, as well as friendly hosts. From that perspective, the invasion of the North wasn’t really necessary.
As well, materiel had always been the Confederates’ biggest problem. Half the size of its foe, the Army of Northern Virginia still found it necessary to augment what weapons and ammunition Richmond could send them with whatever they could capture from the Yankees. While in Pennsylvania, the ANV
could live off the land. But the orchards didn’t grow bullets, and the wheat fields provided no powder. The further Lee led his army into Pennsylvania, the further his supply line was stretched and the more vulnerable it became. Eighty-one years later, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery would lead British and American forces on a similar push into Holland (Operation Market-Garden), which failed its objective with severe consequences for the Allied advance.








